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NEW FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS
TAKE EFFECT
On November 1, 1991, new federal guidelines for sentencing organiza-
tional defendants became law.I The federal sentencing guidelines pro-
vide standards for the imposition of remedial orders, fines, probation,
and/or special assessments. As amended, the guidelines promise higher
fines, less judicial discretion, more power for prosecutors, and a drastic
change in the way corporations and other organizations respond to ille-
gal conduct.
I. BACKGROUND
Prior to 1984, federal judges had considerable discretion in sentencing
defendants.2 However, in 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform
1. United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 8, at 347
(1992) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. The sentencing guidelines define an organization as "a person other
than an individual." Id. § 8Al.l, cmt. n.l. This definition of an organization is identical to that
used in the Criminal Code. 18 U.S.C. § 18 (1988). See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
2. Before 1984, Congress included a maximum fine and maximum term of imprisonment
within each substantive provision that criminalized particular conduct. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1988) ("Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud.., for the
purpose of executing such scheme... places in any post office ... any matter or thing whatever to be
sent or delivered.., shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both,"). See also S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3222 ("[C]urrent Federal law contains no general sentencing provision. Instead, current law
specifies the maximum term of imprisonment and the maximum fine for each Federal offense in the
section that describes the offense.").
Absent general standards, judges lacked guidance in choosing an appropriate sentence within the
statutory maximums. Id. at 3221 ("[Sentence] disparities... can be traced directly to the unfettered
discretion the law confers on those judges and parole authorities responsible for imposing and imple-
menting the sentence. This sweeping discretion flows from the lack of any statutory guidance or
review procedures to which courts and parole boards might look.").
The sentencing judge's discretion generally was not subject to review by appellate courts. Only
two special sentencing statutes provided for appellate review of sentences, unless the court imposed
an illegal sentence. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221 n.7. Defendants sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1982) (repealed 1986),
which provided for a sentence of up to 25 years if the defendant was found to be a "dangerous special
offender," were entitled to judicial review. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1982) (repealed 1986), either a
defendant sentenced as a "dangerous special offender" under § 3575, or the United States could
appeal the sentence to a court of appeals. Id. After reviewing the sentence, the sentencing proce-
dure and the sentencing court's findings and rationale, the appellate court could then affirm the
sentence, impose a different sentence, or remand for further sentencing proceedings. Id.
Constitutional review of sentences was also very limited. Although the Eighth Amendment of the
Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, the Supreme Court has sharply divided on the
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Act ("Sentencing Act")3 as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984.4 The Sentencing Reform Act established statutory stan-
dards for the imposition of sentences,5 and provided general criteria to
assist judges in choosing the best sentence.6 In addition, Congress estab-
extent to which an appellate court may review a sentence on constitutional grounds. In Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), the Court held in a 5-4 decision that a life sentence without parole,
imposed for a defendant's seventh non-violent felony conviction, violated the defendant's Eighth
Amendment guarantee of proportionality. Id. at 303. The majority stated that the Eighth Amend-
ment required a comparison between the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, as
well as between the penalty imposed, penalties imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction,
and penalties imposed for the same offense in different jurisdictions. Id. at 290-92. The dissent
believed that the legislature should decide the severity of penalties, and that the Eighth Amendment
only required review of the type of sentence rather than the length of sentence. Id. at 310, 313
(Burger, C.I., dissenting). However, even under the majority's analysis, appellate review was limited
in scope. See, eg., FRANK MILLER ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 1120 (1986)
(sentencing review was seldom meaningful because appellate courts are so reluctant to override the
trial court's discretion); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989):
[The sentencing] court... usually did exercise, very broad discretion... This led almost
inevitably to the conclusion on the part of a reviewing court that the sentencing judge "sees
more and senses more" than the appellate court; thus, the judge enjoyed the "superiority of
his nether position," for that court's determination as to what sentence was appropriate
met with virtually unconditional deference on appeal.
Id. at 363-64.
3. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-239, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987-2040 (1984) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3551-3566, 3571-3586 (1988), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
4. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
5. For example, under the sentencing guidelines, for organizations found guilty of an offense a
judge must impose either a fine, probation, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(c) (1988). In addition, the
judge may impose an order of criminal forfeiture, an order of notice of conviction to the victim, or an
order of restitution. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3554-3556 (1988). An order of restitution may require the
defendant to return property, or its value, and pay for medical and related services. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3663(b)(1), (b)(2) (1988). If the defendant is sentenced to probation, the restitution order is auto-
matically a condition of the probation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(g) (1988).
6. Under the Sentencing Reform Act, a defendant shall be sentenced "so as to achieve the
purposes set forth in... section 3553(a)(2) to the extent that they are applicable in light of all the
circumstances of the case." 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (1988). Section 3553(a) directs the court to con-
sider seven factors when determining a sentence:
1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant; 2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,
and to provide the defendant with needed education or vocational training, medical care,
or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; 3) the kinds of sentences
available; 4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established.., as set forth in
the guidelines that are issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(a)(1) and that are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; 5) any pertinent
policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994 (a)(2)
that is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; 6) the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct; and 7) the need to provide restitution to any victims.
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lished the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission"),7 an
independent agency of the judicial branch of the federal government
charged with promulgating guidelines to assist judges in applying the
statutory sentencing standards.8 The Sentencing Reform Act mandates
that a judge impose a sentence within the Commission's guidelines, or
state why the sentence deviates from the range established by the
guidelines.9
Initially, the Commission only promulgated guidelines for sentencing
18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1)-(7) (1988).
Specific statutory criteria control the imposition of probation and of fines. There are three
mandatory conditions of probation: (1) the defendant must not commit any federal, state, or local
crimes during the term of probation; (2) the defendant must not possess any illegal controlled sub-
stance; and (3) if the offense is a felony, the defendant must pay either a fine, make restitution, or
perform community service, unless such a condition would be plainly unreasonable. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3563(a) (1988). Discretionary conditions of probation include fines, restitution, notice to victims,
orders to refrain from specific business, community service, reports to a probation officer, and any
other such conditions as the court may impose. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) (1988).
A fine imposed on an organization as a sentence is limited to the greater of the amount specified in
the law creating the offense, $500,000 for felonies and misdemeanors resulting in death, $200,000 for
Class A misdemeanors, and S10,000 for Class B and C misdemeanors not resulting in death, or
$10,000 for infractions. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c) (1988). However, if the defendant derives pecuniary
gain from the offense, or causes pecuniary loss, the maximum fine is twice the gain or loss, whichever
is greater. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (1988). When imposing the fine, the court must consider the factors
listed in § 3553(a), plus the defendant's income and financial resources, the burden on the defendant,
any pecuniary loss inflicted on others, the amount of any restitution, the need to deprive the defend-
ant of illegally obtained gains, whether the defendant can pass on to consumers the expense of the
fine, the size of the organization, and any measures taken to discipline the responsible persons and
prevent a recurrence of such an offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a) (1988).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988). The Commission is composed of seven members, three of whom
must be federal judges. Id. Under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 994(o), the Commission periodically
prepares draft amendments to the guidelines, then publishes the drafts in the Federal Register for
public comment. Once the Commission has voted to adopt the final version of an amendment to the
guidelines, it is published in the Federal Register, with a stated future effective date. 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(p) (1988). If Congress takes no contrary action before the effective date specified, the guide-
line becomes law. Id.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (1988). The Supreme Court, in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361 (1989), upheld the constitutionality of the guidelines and of the Commission itself. Id. at 374,
412. In Mistretta, the Court sustained both the binding nature of the guidelines, and the authority of
the Commission to promulgate the guidelines, against claims that the Sentencing Reform Act dele-
gated excessive legislative power to the Commission. Id. at 412.
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), (b) (1988). A judge may deviate from the guidelines when the case
presents circumstances which were not adequately taken into account by the Commission. Id. Re-
gardless of whether the judge imposes a sentence within the guidelines, the judge must state in open
court why a particular sentence was imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988). In addition, the judge
must indicate the reasons for selecting a particular sentence within the guideline's range, or the
reasons for imposing a sentence outside of the range. Id.
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individuals,"° leaving organizations subject to the judges' discretionary
sentencing power.11 However, the Sentencing Reform Act charged the
Commission with standardizing sentencing for all types of defendants.' 2
Consequently, the Commission drafted guidelines for sentencing organi-
zations which were submitted to Congress on May 1, 1991.13 The federal
sentencing guidelines for organizations became law on November 1,
1991.14
10. For a general discussion of the guidelines as initially promulgated by the Commission, see
26 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1239 (1989) (overview of the Sentencing Act's policies and the mechanics of
the guidelines). The initial sentencing guidelines covered only individual defendants because organi-
zational defendants presented different and complex sentencing issues. However, in 1988 the Com-
mission began drafting a separate chapter of the guidelines to provide standards for sentencing
organizations. United States Sentencing Commission Annual Report 61 (1988).
11. Notice of Proposed Additions to Sentencing Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 46,600 (1990). The
Sentencing Reform Act itself did contain some general references to organizations. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 3572(a) (stating factors for a judge to consider in selecting a fine, which would be relevant
only if the defendant was an organization, including whether the defendant can pass on to consumers
the expense of the fine, the size of the organization, and whether any measures were taken to disci-
pline the responsible persons to prevent a recurrence of such an offense). See also U.S.S.G., supra
note 1, § 2Rl.1 (containing guidelines for antitrust offenses which specifically distinguish between
factors to consider when fining an individual defendant and factors to consider when fining an orga-
nizational defendant).
12. The Commission is responsible for providing certainty and fairness in sentencing, avoiding
unwarranted sentence disparity, and accomplishing the objectives set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
28 U.S.C. § 9911(b) (1988). See supra notes 6 and 7. This mandate does not distinguish between
individual and organizational defendants, and by its terms requires that the Commission establish
sentencing policies and practices for the entire federal criminal justice system. Id. In addition, the
legislative history indicates that Congress intended the Commission to have broad powers to formu-
late guidelines for sentencing. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 39 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3234 ("The bill creates a sentencing guidelines system that is intended to
treat all classes of offenses committed by all categories of offenders consistently."). Moreover, when
organizations and individuals are prosecuted simultaneously for offenses arising from the same crim-
inal conduct, the same goals and principles for sentencing should apply. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1,
intro. cmt., at 347.
13. Notice of Submission of Amendments to Congress, 56 Fed. Reg. 22,762 (1991) [hereinafter
Submission of Amendments]. In July, 1988, the Commission published a discussion draft of the
sentencing guidelines for organizations and held two public hearings on the subject. See Stanley S.
Arkin, Corporate Sentencing Guidelines---Again, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 11, 1990, at 3. In November, 1989,
the Commission published a preliminary proposal. Id. However, the reaction of the business com-
munity to the 1989 proposal was generally negative. Id. In addition, the Justice Department, which
initially supported the 1989 proposal, later withdrew its support. In March, 1990, the Commission
withdrew the November 1989 draft and published a third proposal. Id. Action on these proposals
was delayed because three of the seven Commission slots were vacant. Id. In October, 1990, the
Commission proposed yet another draft. Stanley S. Arkin, Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, N.Y.
L.J., June 13, 1991, at 3. After several major revisions, the Commission finally voted to accept the
amended October 1990 guidelines on April 26, 1991. Id.
14. Under 28 U.S.C. § 994(p), the Commission is directed to review and revise the sentencing
guidelines, and submit the amendments to Congress no later than the first day of May each year.
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II. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS
The Commission intended for the new guidelines to "provide just pun-
ishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for organizations to main-
tain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and reporting
criminal conduct."15 The guidelines seek to achieve these goals through
four methods: restitution and remedial orders, fines, organizational pro-
bation and special assessments, forfeitures and costs.1 6
The guidelines apply to any organization as "a person other than an
individual." 7 Under this definition, "organization" includes: corpora-
tions, partnerships, associations, joint stock companies, unions, trusts,
pension funds, unincorporated and nonprofit organizations, and govern-
ments and their political subdivisions.1
A. Restitution and Remedial Orders
The sentencing court's first goal under the guidelines is to ensure that
the convicted organization compensates the victims of its conduct and
remedies the harm it caused.19 In general, the sentencing court must
order the organization to make restitution.2 ° The court may also order
the organization to take remedial action, such as creating a trust fund to
remedy expected future harm, recalling a product for a food and drug
violation, or cleaning up an environmental violation.21 In addition, the
Absent Congressional action to the contrary, the amendments become law on the date specified by
the Commission. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988). The Commission specified November 1, 1991 as the
effective date of the sentencing guidelines for organizations. Submission of Amendments, supra note
13, at 22,762.
15. U.S.S.G. supra note 1, intro. cmt., at 347.
16. Id. § 8A1.2. These methods are cumulative. The sentencing court's first duty is to ensure
that the harm is remedied. Id. The court then must impose a fine based on the seriousness of the
offense and the culpability of the organization. Id. Finally, the court may decide to order probation
to ensure that the other sanctions are fully implemented or to "reduce the likelihood of future crimi-
nal conduct." Id.
17. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8AI.I, cmt. n.l.
18. Id.
19. The general application instructions direct the court first to consider the sentencing require-
ments pertaining to restitution, and remedial relief under Part B of the guidelines, before determin-
ing a fine. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8AI.2(a). See also infra note 28.
20. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at XVII (highlights of the 1991 amendments). The court may elect
not to order restitution only if "the complication and prolonging of the sentencing process that
would result from fashioning an order of restitution outweigh the need to provide restitution
'through the criminal process.'" Id. (analyzing § 8B1. of the guidelines).
21. These examples of remedial orders are listed in the commentary to § 8B1.2. Significantly,
the Commission chose to include, as examples, environmental and food and drug offenses, because
these crimes are not subject to the guideline's mandatory fines. See infra note 35 and accompanying
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court may order notice to the victim,22 or order community service that
is "reasonably designed to repair the harm caused by the offense."23
B. Criminal Purpose Organizations
The sentencing guidelines contain a "death penalty" 24 for organiza-
tions that operate primarily for a criminal purpose, or primarily by crim-
inal means. 25 If the court determines that an organization is a criminal
purpose organization, the court must impose a fine that is large enough
to divest the organization of its net assets.26 The guidelines define net
assets as including all assets that remain after the organization pays all
legitimate claims by known, innocent bona fide creditors.27 Restitution
must also take precedence over the death penalty fine.28
The only standards furnished in the guidelines for determining
whether an organization is operated primarily for a criminal purpose in-
struct a court to examine the nature and circumstances of the offense,
and the history and characteristics of the organization. 29 Because these
are not very detailed standards, applying them may cause problems in
practice.30
C. Fines
The most significant aspect of the new guidelines is the provision for
calculating fines. 31 However, the provisions for determining a fine con-
tained in the new guidelines are not generally applicable. Unlike reme-
dial orders, death penalty fines, and probation, none of which depend on
the particular offense, fines are only imposed under the new guidelines if
text. However, the latter offenses are still subject to the provisions on restitution, remedial orders,
and probation. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8Al.l.
22. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B1.4. Under an order mandating notice to victims, a defendant
found guilty of fraud or other intentionally deceptive practices must "give reasonable notice and
explanation of the conviction" to the victims of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3555 (1988).
23. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B1.3.
24. See Elkan Abramowitz, Reaching Deeper Into the Deep Pockets, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 2, 1990, at
3 n.12.
25. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8Cl.
26. Id.
27. U.S.S.G., supra note I, § 8C1.1, cmt. n.l.
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 3572(b) (1988) ("[Ihe court shall impose a fine only to the extent it will
not impair the defendant's ability to make restitution.").
29. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C1.1 cmt.
30. Abramowitz, supra note 24.
31. Stanley S. Arkin, Business Crime, N.Y. L.J., June 13, 1991, at 3.
[Vol. 70:987
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss3/12
1992] SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS
the organization is convicted of one of the offenses listed in section 8C2.1
of the guidelines.32 If the offense for which the organization is convicted
is not listed in this section, the guidelines instruct the court to determine
a fine by applying the criteria in sections 3553 and 3572 of the Sentencing
Act.3
3
The roster of listed offenses includes many of the offenses for which
corporations are most commonly convicted in federal courts, such as an-
titrust, fraud, and tax crimes. 34 The Commission expects that the sen-
32. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at XVII (explaining that the application of the new sentencing
guidelines depends on whether the offense for which the organization is convicted is listed in § 8C2.1
of the new guidelines).
33. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at XVII. Some of the offenses not contained in § 8C2.1 include
obstruction of justice, offenses involving food, drugs and agriculture, and environmental offenses.
Id. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3572 (1988) for the standards for imposing a fine when the offense is not
contained in § 8C2. I.
34. The offenses covered by the fine guidelines under § 8C2.1 are not listed by name or by
citation; instead the guidelines refer to the sections in Chapter Two, governing individual defendants.
Thus, to determine whether a given crime is listed, one must first find which section of the guidelines
covers that crime, then determine if that section is listed in § 8C2. 1. The listed crimes include:
Property Offenses: larceny, embezzlement, and other forms of theft; receiving, transporting, or
possessing stolen property; property damage or destruction; trespass; commercial bribery; criminal
copyright or trademark infringement; and altering vehicle identification numbers or trafficking in
motor vehicles with altered numbers.
Public Officials Crimes: bribery; extortion; offering or receiving gifts; payment or receipt of unau-
thorized compensation; loans or gifts to bank examiners, to get a loan, to get a discount on commer-
cial paper or to get an adjustment of farm indebtedness; and fraud involving deprivation of right to
honest public officials, conspiracy to defraud by interference with government functions.
Drug Offenses: sale or transport of paraphernalia; illegal use of a registration number to manufac-
ture, distribute or transport a controlled substance; manufacture of a controlled substance in excess
of registration quota; and illegal transfer of controlled substances.
Criminal Enterprises and Racketeering: gambling; transmission of wagering information; dealing
in contraband cigarettes; bribery, theft, or embezzlement of employee pensions; false statements or
concealment of fact in relation to ERISA documents; theft or embezzlement from a labor union;
falsifying Labor Management Reporting records; and unlawful bribes or gifts to labor organizations.
Fraud: fraud, deceit, and insider trading.
Other: transporting, importing or mailing obscene matter; failure to report theft of explosive
materials; improper storage of explosive materials; unlawful receipt, possession or transportation of
firearms; harboring unlawful aliens; odometer violation; bid rigging, price-fixing or market allocation
agreements; money laundering; using money derived from unlawful activity; other monetary trans-
action violations; various tax crimes; and various antitrust violations. U.S.S.G., supra note 1,
§ 8C2.I.
See also Barbara Franklin, Meting Out a Sentence, N.Y. L.J. Apr. 25, 1991, at 5 (noting that
according to the Sentencing Commission, in 1989 and 1990, 444 corporations were sentenced in
federal courts: 30% for fraud, 18.2% for antitrust violations, 9.6% for environmental, 5.2% for
obscenity, and 5.2% for income tax); Molly Rath, Commission Sets Uniform Penalties on Corporate
Crime, WASH. Bus. J., Dec. 10, 1990, § 1, at 20 (explaining that the most common crimes by organi-
zations are defense procurement fraud, tax fraud, and environmental offenses).
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tencing guidelines will cover eighty-one percent of all of the federal
prosecutions of corporations.35
If the offense is covered by the fine-setting provisions of the new guide-
lines, the court must follow a complex series of steps in order to deter-
mine the range from which to choose a fine. 36  First, the court must
assess the organization's ability to pay restitution. If it is evident that the
organization will not be able to pay the ordered restitution, the court
need not determine the appropriate guideline fine range because, under
the new guidelines, no fine will be imposed.37
Second, the court must determine the base fine.38 The base fine con-
sists of the greater of three figures: (1) the amount assigned by the
guidelines for the particular offense for which the organization was con-
victed;39 (2) the gain to the organization from the offense;40 or (3) the
loss from the offense caused by the organization, to the extent such loss
35. Sharon LaFraniere, Corporate Lawbreakers May Face Tougher Penalties, WASH. POST,
Apr. 27, 1991, at A6. However, controversial matters such as the sentencing of corporations con-
victed for violating environmental, export control, and product safety statutes or regulations are not
covered by the guidelines. Franklin, supra note 34, at 5. Because environmental crimes are not
included in the organizational guidelines, in real terms, the new sentencing guidelines will cover a
decreasing proportion of prosecutions as the number of environmental prosecutions increases.
36. For each count covered by § 8C2.1, the court must proceed through the complex fine pro-
cedures set forth in the new sentencing guidelines. For counts not covered under § 8C2.1, the court
should determine a fine under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3572 (1988). When an organiza-
tion is convicted of more than one count and one count falls within the guidelines and one does not,
the court should apply the applicable standards as outlined above and add the two fines together to
determine the fine to be imposed. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.10 & cmt.
37. See U.S.S.G., supra note I, § 8C2.2(a). Under § 8C2.2(a), no fine guideline range determi-
nation need be made because under § 8C3.3 no fine would be imposed. See also supra note 28. Note
that although the specific language in § 8C2.2(a) states that no fine would be imposed when the
organization is unable to pay restitution, § 8C3.3(a) merely states that a fine will be reduced to the
extent "that imposition of such fine would impair its ability to make restitution to victims." Id.
§ 8C3.3(a).
38. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at XVIII (the base fine level is "intended to measure the serious-
ness of the offense").
39. Id. § 8C2.4(a)(I). The applicable base fine is determined by using the standards in Chapter
Two of the sentencing guidelines to determine the offense level, and then using the "Offense Level
Fine Table" contained in § 8C2.4(d) to find the specified fine for each offense level. For example, an
offense level of 10 carries a fine of $20,000. Id. § 8C2.4(d).
All listed offenses are described and assigned a level in Chapter Two of the guidelines promulgated
for individual defendants. The offense levels roughly correspond to the seriousness of the crime.
Thus, the higher the level, the more serious the crime and the greater the assigned base fine. The
guidelines provide the following table which specifies the base fine for each offense level:
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss3/12
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was caused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.
41
Third, the court must adjust the base fine based on the organization's
culpability score.42 Every organization begins with a culpability score of
five;4a the judge then adds or subtracts points depending on the organiza-
tion's conduct before and after the offense.' Four general categories of
conduct may increase an organization's culpability score. First, depend-
ing on the number of employees in the organization, the score is in-
creased by one to five points if high level personnel were involved in the
offense, were willfully ignorant of the offense or tolerance of the offense
Offense Level Amount Offense Level Amount
6 or less $5,000 22 $1,200,000
7 $7,500 23 $1,600,000
8 $10,000 24 $2,100,000
9 $15,000 25 $2,800,000
10 $20,000 26 $3,700,000
11 $30,000 27 $4,800,000
12 $40,000 28 $6,300,000
13 $60,000 29 $8,100,000
14 $85,000 30 $10,500,000
15 $125,000 31 $13,500,000
16 $175,000 32 $17,500,000
17 $250,000 33 $22,000,000
18 $350,000 34 $28,500,000
19 $500,000 35 $36,000,000
20 S650,000 36 $45,500,000
21 $910,000 37 $57,500,000
38 or more $72,500,000
Id. § 8C2.4(d).
40. Id. § 8C2.4(a)(2).
41. Id. § 8C2.4(a)(3). Under either § 8C2.4(a)(2) or (a)(3), the court may approximate the gain
or loss; however, if calculating the gain or loss would "unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing
process," the court may use the offense level to determine the base fine. Id. § 8C2.4(c). See also 18
U.S.C. § 3571(d) (1988). When multiple defendants are convicted, and the base fine is calculated
pursuant to § 8C2.4(a)(2) or § 8C2.4(aX3), the court may apportion the gain or loss among the
defendants according to their relative culpability "and other pertinent factors." U.S.S.G., supra note
1, § 8C2.4, cmt. n.4.
42. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5. Persons within substantial authority personnel are defined
as individuals "who within the scope of their authority exercise a substantial measure of discretion in
acting on behalf of an organization." Id. § 8A1.2, cmt. n.3(c).
Where an organization meets the above standard, the amount of points added depends upon the
greater of the number of employees within the particular unit or the organization as a whole. Id.
§ 8C2.5(b). The judge will add five points to an organization or unit with 5,000 or more employees,
four points if the organization or unit has 1,000 or more employees; three points if it has 200 or more
employees; two points if it has 50 or more employees, and one point if it only has 10 or more
employees. Id.
43. Id. § 8C2.5(a).
44. Id. §§ 8C2.5(b)-(g).
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was pervasive throughout the unit.45 Second, a court will add one or two
points if the organization has a prior criminal history.46 Third, a court
will add one or two points if the offense violated a judicial order, an
injunctive order, or a condition of probation.47 Finally, a court must add
three points if the organization willfully obstructed justice during the in-
vestigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the current offense a.4
A court may also lower an organization's culpability score. Three
points are subtracted if the organization has "an effective program to
prevent and detect violations of law."'49 In addition, five points are sub-
tracted if the organization reports the offense itself50 two points are sub-
45. Id. § 8C2.5(b). The general standard for the addition of culpability points under
§ 8C2.5(b)(1)(A) is whether "(i) an individual within high-level personnel of the organization par-
ticipated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the offense; or (ii) tolerance of the offense by
substantial authority personnel was pervasive throughout the organization." Id.
High-level personnel are defined as "individuals who have substantial control over the organiza-
tion or who have a substantial role in the making of policy. Id. § 8AI.2, cmt. n.3(b). Directors,
executive officers, individuals in charge of a major business unit, and individuals with substantial
ownership interests all qualify as high-level personnel. Id. Section 8C2.5(a) directs a court to begin
with five points and then apply subsections (b) through (g) to determine how many points to add or
subtract. Id.
46. Id. § 8C2.5(c). One point is added if any part of the current offense occurred within 10
years after a criminal proceeding based on similar misconduct, or civil or administrative proceedings
based on at least two separate instances of like misconduct. Two points are added if any part of the
current offense occurred within five years. Id. When considering the prior history of an organiza-
tion, the court is directed to examine the "underlying economic entity," without taking into account
its legal structure or ownership. Id. § 8C2.5(c), cmt. n.6. Thus, a company that has merged with, or
has been acquired, by a larger company retains its prior history.
47. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5(d). Two points are added if the organization violated a
judicial or injunctive order when it committed the current offense. Two points will also be added if
the organization violates a condition of probation by engaging in similar misconduct. One point is
added for otherwise violating a condition of probation. Id.
48. Id. § 8C2.5(e).
49. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5(t). An effective program is defined in the commentary to
§ 8A1.2. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. The court may not subtract culpability
points if a high-level individual within the organization, a high-level individual within a unit that has
200 or more employees, or an individual responsible for the organization's prevention program par-
ticipated in, condoned, or was wilfully ignorant of the offense. Id. If a person with substantial
authority participated in the offense, a rebuttable presumption is raised that the organization did not
have an effective prevention program; therefore, the organization is not entitled to subtraction of
culpability points. Id. Finally, if the organization unreasonably delays reporting the offense, a court
may not subtract points under this subsection. Id.
50. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1). Note, however, that the organization must report the offense prior to a
threat of imminent disclosure or commencement of a government investigation and within a reason-
able time after learning of the offense. Id. In addition, the organization must fully cooperate in the
event of an investigation and demonstrate affirmative responsibility for the criminal conduct. Id.
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tracted if it cooperates in the investigation;5" and one point will be
subtracted if it affirmatively accepts responsibility for its conduct. 52
Finally, the court determines the appropriate fine range by multiplying
the base fine by minimum and maximum multipliers, which are derived
from a table that assigns the multipliers on the basis of the organization's
culpability score. 53 The bottom of the fine range is the base fine times the
minimum multiplier, and the top of the fine range is the base fine times
the maximum multiplier. If an organization's beginning culpability score
of five is not adjusted upward or downward, the minimum fine will be the
base fine itself and the maximum fine will be twice the base fine.54 If the
organization reduces its culpability score to zero, the minimum fine will
be five percent of the base fine and the maximum, twenty percent of the
base fine.55 An organization whose culpability score falls within the
highest category of ten points or more will face a minimum fine of double
the base fine, and a maximum fine of four times the base fine.56 Finally, if
51. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(2). The organization must also demonstrate acceptance of affirmative re-
sponsibility for the criminal conduct. Id.
52. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(3). Entering a guilty plea and admitting the conduct will ordinarily be suffi-
cient. However, an organization may qualify for this mitigation even after a trial and conviction.
Id. § 8C2.5(g)(3), cmt. n.13.
53. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.7. To determine the appropriate multiplier, a court must use
the culpability score computed under § 8C2.5 and consult the table contained in § 8C2.6. The table
provides as follows:
Culpability Score Minimum Multiplier Maximum Multiplier
10 or more 2.00 4.00
9 1.80 3.60
8 1.60 3.20
7 1.40 2.80
6 1.20 2.40
5 1.00 2.00
4 0.80 1.60
3 0.60 1.20
2 0.40 0.80
1 0.20 0.40
0 or less 0.05 0.20
Id. § 8C2.6.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. An example may clarify this procedure. Assume that a corporation is convicted of
defrauding the government of $100,000. Fraud is a listed offense, (see § 2F1. 1, listing fraud), with an
offense level of twelve. The base fine for offense level twelve is $40,000. Id. § 8C2.4. Under
§ 8C2.4, the court must then decide which of the following potential base fines is greater: the com-
puted figure of $40,000, the gain to the firm, or the loss to the government. Id. Assuming the court
chooses $40,000 as the base fine, the court must tally the firm's culpability score under § 8C2.5. If
the beginning score of five does not need to be adjusted upward or downward under the guidelines
detailed in § 8C2.5, the appropriate fine range is S40,000 to S80,000 (the minimum equals one times
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the minimum fine as determined by the guidelines is greater than the
maximum fine authorized by law,57 the court should impose the maxi-
mum fine authorized by law.58 Similarly, if the maximum fine under the
guidelines is less than the minimum fine required by statute, the mini-
mum statutory fine is deemed to be the guideline fine.5 9
Once the court determines the fine range, the guidelines instruct the
court to consider ten general factors in deciding what exact fine within
the range will be imposed.60 The court must add to the actual fine any
gain that the organization realized which will not be repaid through res-
titution.6' The court may reduce the fine if it finds the organization's
ability to make restitution to victims will be impaired or if the organiza-
tion will not be able to pay even the minimum range amount.62 The
guidelines also include several other factors which may justify upward or
downward departures from the established fine range.63
the base fine and the maximum, two times the base fine). Id. § 802.6. However, if the firm has 1000
employees and the president of the organization was aware of the fraud, under § 8C2.5, four points
must be added to the culpability score. Absent any downward adjustments under § 8C2.5, the or-
ganization's culpability score now equals nine, and the fine range increases from $72,000 to $144,000
(the minimum equals the base fine times 1.80 and the maximum equals the base fine times 3.60). Id.
However, if the organization fully cooperates in the investigation and accepts responsibility for its
criminal conduct, two points may be subtracted from the score of nine under § 8C2.5(g)(2), leaving a
culpability score of seven, with a resulting fine range from $56,000 to $128,000 (the minimum equals
the base fine times 1.40 and the maximum equals the base fine times 3.20). Id.
57. Two different laws may limit the maximum fine. First, 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c) limits the maxi-
mum fine for felonies and misdemeanors resulting in death to $500,000, the fine for Class A misde-
meanors to $200,000, and the fine for Class B and C misdemeanors to $10,000. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3571(c) (1988). Second, the statutory provision that establishes the substantive crime may include
a maximum fine. See also supra note 6.
58. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C3.1(b).
59. Id. § 8C3.1(c).
60. Id. § 8C2.8(a)(1)-(10). The first factor restates the primary goals of the sentencing guide-
lines for organizations: that the sentence reflect the severity of the crime, promote respect for the
law, justly punish, adequately deter and protect the public. Id. See also U.S.S.G., supra note 1,
§ 8C2.8(a)(1), intro. cmt. In addition, § 8C2.8 instructs a court to consider: the role of the organiza-
tion in the offense, any collateral consequences of the conviction, any nonpecuniary losses, whether
the victim was vulnerable, whether any high-level organizational personnel with a prior record par-
ticipated or condoned the criminal conduct, other civil or criminal misconduct by the organization,
culpability scores in excess of ten or lower than zero, partial mitigation or aggravation of the offense
under § 8C2.5, or any of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a) (1988).
61. U.S.S.G., supra note I, § 8C2.9.
62. Id. § 8C3.3.
63. Under § 8C3.4, a court may offset a fine imposed on a closely held corporation by the fines
already assessed against individuals for the same offense. Id. § 8C3.4. In addition, a court may
impose a fine below the range under § 8C4.1, when an organization substantially assisted the author-
ities; under § 8C4.7, when the convicted organization is a public entity; under § 8C4.8, when mem-
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D. Probation
The new guidelines set forth the circumstances under which a court is
required to sentence an organization to a term of probation." In addi-
tion, the guidelines mandate certain conditions of probation,65 and rec-
ommend other conditions, including publication of the offense,66 periodic
submissions of the organization's books to the court,67 or the develop-
ment of a program to detect and prevent violations of law.68 The court
may also assess costs, impose additional penalties as authorized by law,
and order forfeiture.69
bers of the organization, other than the shareholders, are direct victims of the crime; and, under
§ 8C4.9, when the organization has agreed to pay remedial costs which greatly exceed the organiza-
tion's gain from the offense. Id. §§ 8C4.1, 8C4.7-8C4.9.
A fine above the range may be imposed under § 8C4.2, when the crime involved a risk of death or
bodily injury; under § 8C4.3, when the offense involved a threat to national security; under § 8C4.4,
when the offense threatened the environment; under § 8C4.5, when the offense threatened the integ-
rity or continued existence of a market; and, under § 8C4.6, when the offense was connected with
corruption of a public official. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, §§ 8C4.2-8C4.6. In addition, an upward
departure may also be appropriate to offset a reduction in the organization's culpability score under
§ 8C2.5(f), or when the organization's culpability score exceeded ten. Id. §§ 8C4.10, 8C4.11.
64. The court must order probation if necessary to secure enforcement of a remedial or restitu-
tion order, if necessary to ensure an organization's ability to make payments toward a monetary
penalty, when there is no program to prevent and detect violations and the organization has fifty or
more employees, when an organization has engaged in similar misconduct within the past five years,
when high-level personnel participated in the misconduct and have engaged in similar misconduct
within the past five years, when necessary to prevent future misconduct, when no fine was imposed,
or when necessary to accomplish the purposes for sentencing set forth in the Sentencing Act.
U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8D.l.
65. Id. § 8D.I.3. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a), a court must include the condition that the
organization not commit any federal, state or local crime during the term of probation. Id. If the
probation is ordered because of the commission of a felony, the court must impose one of the follow-
ing conditions: a fine, restitution, or community service, unless the condition would be unreasona-
ble. Id. If the condition is unreasonable, the court must impose a condition from 18 U.S.C.
§ 3563(b). Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b).
66. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8D1.4(a). The publicity must include the nature of the offense,
the fact of conviction, the punishment, and remedial steps taken to prevent recurrence of offenses.
Id.
67. Id. § 8DI.4(b). When probation is ordered to ensure an organization's payment of a mone-
tary penalty, other conditions may be appropriate. Such conditions include: examination of financial
reports, interrogation of knowledgeable individuals with regard to the organization's books, notifica-
tion of adverse changes in business, or specified periodic payments. Id.
68. Id. § 8D1.4(c). When probation is ordered under § 8D1.l(a)(3),(4),(5) or (6), further con-
ditions may be appropriate. These include: developing a prevention program, notifying employees
and shareholders of its criminal behavior and prevention program, or requiring periodic reports to
the court regarding the implementation of such a program. Id.
69. Id. §§ 8E1.l-8E1.3.
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III. IMPACT OF THE GUIDELINES
The new guidelines for sentencing organizational defendants will im-
pact sentencing decisions immediately. The resulting impact is primarily
attributable to the requirement that courts apply whatever sentencing
guidelines are in existence at the time of sentencing, not whatever guide-
lines were in effect when the offense was committed.70 The new guide-
lines will affect each of the different actors in the sentencing process: the
defendant organization, the prosecutor, and the judge who must apply
the guidelines.
A. The Effect on Organizations
1. Compliance Programs
For organizations, the most significant aspect of the new guidelines is
the potential to increase or decrease the fine range. Under the new guide-
lines, an organization has two significant avenues for decreasing its cul-
pability, and in effect, its potential fine: instituting programs to prevent
and detect violations, and self-reporting.7" The guidelines contemplate
stringent programs for internal prevention and detection of violations
and establish specific requirements for formulating and administering an
effective program.72
The primary feature of an effective program is the organization's exer-
cise of due diligence in seeking to detect and prevent violations.73 At a
minimum, to satisfy the due diligence requirement, the organization
must follow the seven steps specified by the guidelines.71 In addition to
70. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), a court must apply the sentencing guidelines that are in
effect on the date of sentencing. See supra note 6. See also United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599 (2d
Cir. 1990) (holding that a court must apply the sentencing guidelines and policy statements in effect
at the time of sentencing, not those existing at the time of the commission of the crime).
71. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
72. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8A1.2, cmt. n.3(k).
73. The commentary defines an effective program as one that is "reasonably designed, imple-
mented, and enforced so that it will be generally effective in preventing and detecting criminal con-
duct." Id. However, failure to detect the specific crime charged does not render a program "not
effective" when the organization has exercised due diligence in attempting to prevent and detect
criminal conduct. Id.
74. Id. The commentary provides the following seven steps for due diligence: (1) the organiza-
tion must establish compliance standards and procedures reasonably capable of reducing criminal
conduct; (2) the organization must assign the responsibility for overseeing compliance to a specific
high-level individual in the organization; (3) the organization should use reasonable care not to
grant substantial discretionary authority to anyone the organization knew or should have known had
a propensity to engage in illegal activity; (4) the organization must effectively communicate its stan-
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due diligence, the sufficiency of a program will vary according to the size
of the organization, the nature of its business, and the organization's
prior history.75 Similarly, the types of offenses that the program must
address and attempt to detect and prevent will depend upon the scope of
the organization's operation, its background, and any applicable industry
practices or standards.76
The new guidelines provide strong incentives for an organization to
adopt prevention and detection programs." Although many firms tradi-
tionally have been skeptical about corporate codes of conduct,78 a per-
suasive incentive to adopt them has now emerged.79 However, the
organization must balance the possibility of mitigating a sentence against
the economic costs of implementing a satisfactory program. In fact,
some have suggested that the guidelines discriminate in favor of big busi-
nesses, which can afford both elaborate compliance programs and the
extra expense of monitoring and training employees.80
Moreover, relying on compliance programs to prevent criminal con-
duct creates the potential for organizations to implement cosmetic pro-
grams, which are only designed to minimize any damage that occurs, not
to actually prevent violations.81 In fact, one commentator has noted that
dards and procedures to all employees, through training programs or written materials; (5) the or-
ganization must take reasonable steps to comply with its own standards by using monitoring and
auditing programs, and creating and publicizing a system where employees may report violations
without fear of retribution; (6) the organization's standards must be consistently enforced through
appropriate discipline; and (7) the organization must take all reasonable measures to respond appro-
priately after an offense is detected and to prevent future similar offenses. Id.
75. Id. § 8A1.2, cmt. at 353. The degree of formality required in a program will vary depend-
ing on the organization's size. Larger organizations will require a greater degree of formality. Id.
76. Id.
77. For example, if a convicted organization has a program that meets the standards set forth in
the commentary to § 8AI.2, the organization may deduct three points from its culpability score
under § 8C2.5(f). If the organization's base fine is $10,000 and the culpability score is only adjusted
downward by the three points, the fine range will be $6,000-412,000. Absent the prevention pro-
gram, the fine range would be $10,000-$20,000. See supra notes 58-60.
78. See, e.g., 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1206 (Aug. 17, 1990) (recognizing that business
people are often skeptical about codes, because codes do not prevent investigations or shield firms
from liability, while they may provide a plaintiff with ammunition by showing that the firm failed to
satisfy even its own standards); Michele Galen, Keeping the Long Arm of the Law at Arm's Length,
Bus. WK., Apr. 22, 1991, at 104 (explaining that codes which restate the law may remove the firm's
defense of ignorance or preclude an argument that the organization's conduct is permissible).
79. See supra note 56 (illustrating the guidelines' potential effect on a firm's fine).
80. John Coffee, Sentencing Commission: Big Business's Best Friend, N.Y. L.J., May 23, 1991,
at 11.
81. In addition, courts may be unable to discern a cosmetic compliance program from a legiti-
mate one. Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
1002 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the guidelines give organizations an odd incentive because they may re-
ward a program that evidently did not work.82 According to one study,
eighty-five percent of the 711 firms surveyed already had an ethics policy
or code of conduct; however only ten percent "actively engaged in ethics
oversight. 8 3
2. Self-Reporting
The mitigation provided by the new guidelines for self-reporting may
be illusory. The maximum amount of mitigation, a deduction of five
points, is only available to firms that report an offense before any investi-
gation begins.84 However, executives are unlikely to risk premature dis-
closure of an offense, and potential waiver of attorney-client and work
product privileges, unless they strongly suspect that the government is
likely to begin an investigation.85 As a result, many businesses will now
face a dilemma: if they fight the charges, they may lose some mitigating
factors; on the other hand, few managements are willing to open their
doors to government investigators.8 6
The potential benefits available from self-reporting and cooperation
will also alter many defense strategies. Traditionally, firms focused on
whether or not to disclose the offense, and on persuading the government
not to press charges.87 Firms often pled guilty to save the expense and
publicity of a trial; and then, the executives focused their energy on influ-
encing the judge to exercise his discretion for a lenient sentence.88 The
new guidelines place a premium on cooperating with the authorities, and
curtail the amount of discretion in sentencing.8 9 Because the incentives
to disclose early are much stronger, management's focus will shift to the
charging stage.90 Firms will seek to influence which base offense is
82. Id. See also John Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punishment, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 29, 1990, at 5.
Interestingly, a program can be "effective" and still fail to prevent or detect the crime with which the
organization is charged. See supra note 73.
83. Galen, supra note 78, at 104 (citing a 1990 study by the Ethics Resource Center in Wash-
ington D.C.).
84. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5(g).
85. Arkin, supra note 13, at 3. See also 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 676, 677 (May 3, 1991).
86. 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1206, 1207 (Aug. 17, 1990).
87. Thomas Holliday et al., Tilting the Balance: The Effect of the Sentencing Guidelines on
Organizational Defendants, 5 L. & Bus. Insights No. 8 (P-H), at 2 (Aug. 1991).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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charged, resulting in great influence over the fine range.9
B. The Effect on Prosecutors and Judges
Prosecutors, who already enjoy considerable discretion in deciding
what charges to levy, will now possess greatly increased power. 92 One
United States Attorney recently stated that a strong factor in the decision
whether or not to indict is whether the organization is making a reason-
able effort to avoid criminal activity.93 Because the guidelines eliminate
much of the uncertainly about what sentence a judge will order, both the
organization and the prosecutor can evaluate options with much greater
specificity.
Finally, the guidelines will strictly constrain judges' discretion in de-
termining sentences. Perhaps this will improve the uniformity of
sentences for organizations. However, many judges have expressed dis-
contentment with the sentencing guidelines for individuals, arguing that
the sentencing guidelines transform the judge into a machine, plugging in
numbers and spitting out an established response.94 The new guidelines
for organizations will likely increase their dissatisfaction and further
erode their discretion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The new organizational sentencing guidelines should have a distinct
effect on the conduct of corporations and other organizations. The struc-
ture of the guidelines creates incentives for organizations to monitor their
internal operations and their agents' activities, and to report violations
themselves. In addition, the guidelines encourage organizations to im-
plement more effective programs to prevent and detect criminal conduct
91. Id.
92. See, eg., Marcia Chambers, The Old Days: When a Plea was a Plea.. ., NAT'L L.J., Nov.
6, 1989, at 13 ("[Prosecutors'] already formidable discretion has expanded exponentially; they have
emerged as the nation's sentencers, say many of the judges."). See also Albert W. Alschuler &
Stephen J. Schyulhofer, Judicial Impressions of the Sentencing Guidelines, 2 FED. SENT. R. 94 (1989)
("What had been a regime of shared discretion could become a regime in which sentencing power is
concentrated in the United States Attorney's office.").
93. Galen, supra note 78, at 104.
94. In the report accompanying the Sentencing Act, Congress expressed that it did not intend
the sentencing guidelines to eliminate a judge's discretion. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
51 (1984) reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3234 ("The sentencing guidelines system will not
remove all of the judge's sentencing discretion. Instead it will guide the judge in making his decision
on the appropriate sentence."). See id. at 3235 ("The Committee does not intend that the guidelines
be imposed in a mechanistic fashion.").
1992] 1003
Washington University Open Scholarship
1004 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
as an attempt to secure lower fines. Although these prevention programs
have been advocated in the past, the programs contemplated by the
guidelines provide much more detailed requirements than the general
codes of ethical conduct already enacted by many corporations. As pri-
vate attorneys urge their organizational clients to implement programs
and take other steps to mitigate potential criminal charges, the roles of
the public prosecutors and judges will subtly change. Prosecutors will
gain greater discretion to shape the sentence a criminal defendant re-
ceives, while judges' participation in the sentencing process will decrease
substantially.
Although the new organizational guidelines will create more uniform
sentences and will increase the defendant's ability to predict and influ-
ence its sentence, the guidelines will also change the way organizations,
prosecutors, and judges function.
Daniel R. Dertke
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